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Abstract: We provide experimental evidence that contractual incompleteness, i.e., the absence 
of third party enforcement of workers’ effort or the quality of the good traded, causes a 
fundamental change in the nature of market interactions.  
If contracts are complete the vast majority of trades are initiated by public offers. Most trades 
take place in one-shot transactions and the contracting parties are indifferent with regard to the 
identity of their trading partner. Moreover, the short side of the market attempts to appropriate 
the whole gains from trade, which causes much disagreement about contract terms.  
If contracts are incomplete the vast majority of trades are initiated by private offers. The 
contracting parties form long-term relations and the provision of low effort or bad quality is 
penalized by the termination of the relationship. The threat of terminating the relation turns out 
to be an extremely powerful discipline device. Markets with incomplete contracts resemble a 
collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. The short side of the 
market shares the gains from trade with the long side of the market so that there is little 
disagreement about contract terms.  
Our results support theories of the labor market that are based on the idea that unemployment is a 
worker discipline device.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In many markets transactions are based on incomplete contracts allowing for considerable 
discretion. The prime example for a market with incomplete contracts is the labor market but 
other markets with complex products – like e.g., the market for customer-tailored software – are 
also characterized by contractual incompleteness. In these markets important elements of the 
contracts are described in a very imprecise manner and third parties are, in general, unable to 
verify whether the parties did or did not meet their obligations. Therefore, the contracting parties 
face serious enforcement problems.1 In the past two decades there has been considerable 
theoretical progress in the analysis of markets with enforcement problems with a strong focus on 
repeated interactions (see e.g., Gintis 1976, Klein and Leffler 1981; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; 
Bowles 1985; Bull 1987; Hart and Holmström 1987; MacLeod and Malcomson 1989, 1993 and 
1998; Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 1994; Dixit 2001). However, in contrast to the progress of 
theory empirical evidence has been sparse. While lack of empirical knowledge is always 
problematic, in our context this lack is even more serious because in the presence of repeated 
interactions there is, in general, a plethora of equilibria (see e.g., Fudenberg and Maskin 1986). 
For this reason theory alone gives us little guidance regarding the likely consequences of 
enforcement problems for the functioning of markets.  
In this paper we show experimentally that contractual incompleteness causes fundamental 
changes in the nature of market interactions. Our experiments indicate that in markets with 
complete contracts, i.e., where the effort or the quality of the good traded is exogenously 
enforced by third parties, the traders are basically indifferent with whom they trade – the identity 
of the trading partner does not matter. As a consequence, the vast majority of trades take place in 
one-shot transactions. Most offers in these markets are public offers that can be accepted by any 
trader on the other side of the market. In addition, there is much disagreement about the contract 
terms because the short side of the market attempts to appropriate almost the whole gains from 
trade.2  
In contrast, in markets with incomplete contracts, where effort is not enforceable by third 
parties, the traders are very much concerned about the identity of the trading partner. They 
endogenously establish bilateral long-term relations and the predominant pattern is repeated 
trading with the same trading partner over extended periods of time. The workers in this market 
                                                 
1 The emphasis in this paper is on contractual incompleteness that is associated with the absence of third party 
enforceability of contracts terms. There are, of course, other forms of contractual incompleteness, which are, 
however, not the object of our study. Our paper is also not concerned with the impact of contractual 
incompleteness on vertical integration (on this question see Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 1995).  
2 Although we believe that our results are relevant for labor markets as well as for goods markets, to ease the 
exposition in the following we present our results in labor market terms.  
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are disciplined by the threat of firing. We show that this threat is an extremely powerful 
discipline device. If firms and workers can voluntarily form and terminate repeated trading 
relations the majority of effort choices is at or close to the maximum. In sharp contrast, if we rule 
out the possibility of repeated trading relations in an incomplete contracts market the majority of 
effort choices is at or close to the minimum. These results neatly complement econometric 
studies indicating that the cost of job loss have been an important determinant of U.S. 
productivity growth (Bowles, Gordon and Weisskopf 1983).  
The long-term relations between firms and workers are established by private offers to 
those workers who performed well in the previous transaction. Over time the market with 
incomplete contracts becomes thoroughly permeated by bilateral relations. Firms voluntarily 
constrain the set of trading partners by addressing their offers to a specific worker and most of 
the offers are immediately accepted so that there is little disagreement about the terms of the 
contract.  
Our results lend support to the disciplining version of the efficiency wage hypthesis (Gintis 
1976, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984, Bowles 1985) as well as to the fairness version of the efficiency 
wage hypothesis (Akerlof 1982, Akerlof and Yellen 1990). The disciplining version is based on 
the idea that the payment of rents in combination with the threat of firing constitutes a discipline 
device for the workers and gives rise to involuntary unemployment. In a series of papers 
MacLeod and Malcomson (1989, 1993, 1998) pointed out that – in the presence of an effort 
enforcement problem – the equilibrium with rents and involuntary unemployment is only one of 
infinitely many equilibria and that the Walrasian outcome with no rents and no involuntary 
unemployment is also an equilibrium. In Malcomson (1999) as well as MacLeod and 
Malcomson (1998) the authors argued, however, that if fairness concerns affect players’ beliefs 
Non-Walrasion outcomes will emerge. Our results indeed show that the market outcome in the 
incomplete contracts condition is Non-Walrasian. Moreover, the behavioral patterns suggest that 
this is due to the existence of fairness concerns.  
Both in the experimental condition with complete and with incomplete contracts we have 
an excess supply of workers. In the market with complete contracts the firms take advantage of 
this excess supply by enforcing contract terms that give the workers little more than their 
reservation payoffs. In the market with incomplete contracts the situation is very different. 
Despite their being in excess supply, workers earn generous rents and firms make no attempts at 
extracting these rents. The reason for this is the presence of a sizeable fraction of fair-minded 
workers who respond to less generous contract offers with lower effort levels. The presence of 
fair-minded workers thus prevents firms from extracting future rents by low current offers. It 
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seems that the firms’ contract offers are largely determined by their attempts at solving the effort 
enforcement problem and that competition has little influence on the contract terms. In addition, 
shirking workers face a high probability of firing in case of low effort, exactly as it is predicted 
by the disciplining approach of efficiency wage theory.  
Several of our results on the bilateralization of markets can also be viewed as an example 
of Williamson’s (1985) fundamental transformation.3 Williamson forcefully argued that – in the 
presence of relation-specific investments – trading relations that are ex-ante subject to outside 
competition become ex-post insulated from outside competition. Due to relation-specific 
investments the parties can create higher gains from trade if they stay together than if they 
separate, inducing a bilateralization of the relation and a weakening of the impact of outside 
competition on the terms of trade. In our experiment workers invest in their reputation as 
trustworthy trading partners. This reputation has value only in the worker’s current trading 
relation because solely his firm knows his effort. Thus, a worker’s reputation as a trustworthy 
person can be viewed as a relation-specific asset. Since the firm can never be completely sure 
whether an alternative worker will be equally trustworthy it has an incentive to stay with the 
same worker in case that the worker has performed well in the past. 
Several aspects of our data suggest that relation-specific reputational assets contribute to 
the existence of long-term relations. Firms, for instance, expect higher effort levels from their 
workers the longer the relationship between the worker and the firm has already lasted. In 
addition, the uncertainty with which firms expect a given effort level also increases with the 
length of the relationship. Moreover, the workers’ actual effort does indeed increase with the 
length of the relationship. This indicates that the value of an employment relation increases with 
the length of the relation because the effort rises and becomes less uncertain the longer the 
relation lasts. Therefore, if firms are aware of this, we should also observe that firms are – ceteris 
paribus – more reluctant to fire workers with whom they transacted more often in the past. It 
turns out that this is indeed the case.  
There are also “methodological” returns from our research. In all of our experiments we 
implemented a finite and commonly known time horizon. In the past the theory of repeated 
games has sometimes been criticized by pointing out that in order to sustain self-enforcing 
agreements an infinite time horizon has to be assumed. For instance, Hart (2001) recently argued 
that this “is hard to square with the fact that people have finite lives.” However, our short 
                                                 
3 Our empirical results are also reminiscent of the paper by Rubinstein and Wolinski (1990). These authors show 
that if the traders in a pair-wise matching and bargaining environment condition their strategies on the identity of 
their trading partner and on past events, non-competitive outcomes may result even if frictionless bargaining is 
possible.  
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theoretical discussion in section 3 and our empirical results suggest that this is too pessimistic a 
view because in the presence of a substantial fraction of fair-minded agents the scope for self-
enforcing agreements is greatly enhanced. Despite the existence of a finite horizon the trading 
parties in our experiment are in fact able to form long-term relations and to enforce effort levels 
far above what can be enforced in one-shot interactions. This shows how the enforcement 
capabilities arising from the possibility of forming finite long-term relations are greatly enhanced 
by the presence of fair-minded agents.4  
We also believe that our experimental design can be used as a “work horse” for the study 
of many interesting and empirically unresolved questions. They provide the basis for examining 
the interaction between implicit and explicit incentives as, for instance, theoretically discussed in 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) or Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995). In addition, it is possible 
to analyze the effects of contract termination laws or of stigma effects arising from 
unemployment. Likewise, questions regarding the role of relational contracts in vertical 
integration decisions (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002) can be usefully pursued in our 
experimental framework.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we discuss the specific 
advantages of laboratory experiments for answering our core questions. This section also 
presents the experimental design. In Section 3 we discuss the theoretical predictions. In Section 4 
we present and interpret our results and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
 
2. An Experimental Approach for the Study of Markets with Incomplete 
Contracts 
 
The ideal data set for studying the effects of lacking third party enforceability on market 
interactions and on the firms’ enforcement strategies is based on a truly exogenous ceteris 
paribus variation in the degree of third party enforceability. The exogenous ceteris paribus 
variation allows the researcher to make causal inferences regarding the impact of different 
degrees of third party enforceability. With such a data set it is, for instance, possible to examine 
how the absence of third party enforceability affects the initiation of contracts in markets, the 
formation of long-term relations or the level of wages and contract terms in general. The 
                                                 
4 In theory similar ideas have been around for a long time (see, e.g., Kreps et al. 1982). What we add is that because 
of the empirical existence of fair-minded types endogenous long-term relations can be part of an equilibrium 
although there is a finite horizon.  
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problem is, however, that it seems almost impossible to find or generate field data that come 
close to this ideal data set:  
First, there are huge measurement problems involved in answering our questions. It is, for 
example, very difficult to construct a convincing index of the degree of third party enforceability 
in the field because this variable depends on many subtle details in the law and the legal 
practices of the courts. Likewise, it is extremely difficult to find convincing measures of the 
firms’ effort requirements, the workers’ actual effort or the job rents. Job rents are insofar 
important for answering our questions as in long-term relations the payment of job rents 
combined with the threat of firing might be an effective effort enforcement strategy. Yet, as the 
debate on the nature of inter-industry wage differentials indicates it is far from obvious whether 
workers in a particular industry, or in particular firms, do indeed earn job-rents, not to speak of 
precise measures for the job rents (Krueger and Summers 1988; Murphy and Topel 1990; 
Gibbons and Katz 1992).  
Second, in reality there are many other reasons, beyond the absence of third party 
enforceability, that may cause long-term relations between trading parties and it seems almost 
impossible to control for all these other reasons. Subtle and, therefore, unobservable forms of 
asset specificity (e.g., firm-specific human capital) may cause long-term relations. There may be 
legal differences across industries and countries or unobservable differences in unwritten, yet 
powerful, business norms. Search and mobility costs, as well as exogenous uncertainty, may 
differ in unobservable ways across firms and industries confounding the impact of third party 
enforceability, even if that variable could be measured appropriately.  
Third, many of the interesting variables are determined simultaneously causing difficult 
endogeneity problems. It seems quite plausible that the actual degree with which the trading 
parties govern their activities by less than complete contracts is also shaped by the effectiveness 
of alternative governance mechanisms like, e.g., long-term implicit contracts. Yet, this means 
that contractual incompleteness does not only affect the parties’ long-term relations but that the 
effectiveness of long-term relations as an enforcement device also affects the parties’ willingness 
to leave contracts incomplete. On the basis of the usually available field data it seems almost 
impossible to disentangle these effects.  
In view of the severe difficulties created by the characteristics of field data it is not 
surprising that only few econometric studies of markets with enforcement problems have been 
conducted. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) examine the determinants of trade credits for 
customers in Vietnam’s emerging private sector. Contract law and the courts provide only weak 
enforcement of agreements in Vietnam so that it seems plausible that the trading parties rely on 
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relational contracts. McMillan and Woodruff provide interesting evidence showing that firms are 
more likely to offer trade credit if (i) the customer has difficulties finding an alternative supplier, 
(ii) the longer the trading relationship has already lasted, and (iii) the more the customer is 
integrated into business networks. Banerjee and Duflo (2000) analyze the role of reputation in 
determining contractual outcomes in the Indian software industry. Their results show that ex-ante 
contracts, as well as the bargaining outcomes after ex-post renegotiation of the contracts, vary 
with those firm characteristics that are plausibly associated with reputation. These studies 
constitute important steps forward in the empirical analysis of relational contracts.5 Yet, on the 
basis of the data used in these studies it seems impossible to make causal inferences regarding 
the impact of third party enforceability on market interactions and contract terms.  
In view of the limitations imposed by field data an experimental approach for answering 
our core questions may provide important additional insights. The power of an experimental 
approach stems from the fact that measurement and endogeneity problems as well as the problem 
of controlling for other factors contributing to long-term relations can be avoided with a single 
stroke: In the laboratory it is no problem to implement an exogenous ceteris paribus variation in 
the degree of third party enforceability.  
 
2.1 Experimental Design 
To examine the consequences of contractual incompleteness we implemented the following three 
treatment conditions. In the first condition, which we call the complete contract condition (C-
condition), the contractually agreed upon effort level was exogenously enforced by the 
experimenter. In the second condition, which we call the incomplete contract condition (ICF-
condition), the worker could choose any feasible effort irrespective of the contractually agreed 
upon level. Both in the C- and in the ICF-conditions firms and workers had the possibility of 
entering into long-term relations. Technically, repeated transactions with the same trading 
partner were possible because subjects had fixed identification (ID) numbers and contract offers 
could be addressed to specific traders (i.e., specific ID numbers).6 Therefore, a firm could make 
offers to the same worker in consecutive periods and, if the worker accepted the offers, a long-
term relation was established. By comparing market interactions and contract terms across the C- 
and the ICF-condition our major research questions can be examined.  
In addition we were also interested in the effectiveness of endogenous long-term relations 
as an effort enforcement device. Therefore, we implemented a third treatment, which we call the 
                                                 
5 The paper by Crocker and Reynolds (1993) examines the determinants of contractual incompleteness. The focus is 
thus quite different compared to the studies of McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Banerjee and Duflo (2000).  
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ICR-condition. The ICR-condition is identical to the ICF-condition except that in the ICR-
condition long-term relations were ruled out. This was achieved by randomly reassigning the ID 
numbers for both the workers and the firms in each period of the game – hence the term ICR 
(Incomplete Contract condition with Random IDs). Thus, in the ICR-condition a worker with, 
say, ID No. 8 in period t may have been assigned ID No. 3 in period t+1, etc.. Since in the ICR 
no long-term relations were possible a comparison between the effort in the ICR and the ICF 
tells us to what extent the possibility of forming and terminating long-term relations contributed 
to the enforcement of more efficient effort levels. This comparison is important because we 
know from several other experiments (e.g., Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997) that fairness 
concerns may contribute to contract enforcement. This means that even in the absence of any 
possibility for long-term relations non-minimal effort levels may be achieved by making 
generous contract offers to the workers because fair workers increase their effort levels in 
response to wage increases.  
In all the conditions there were 15 trading periods and in each period a firm could employ 
at most one worker and a worker could accept at most one job. A trading period had two stages. 
At stage one contract offers were made and, if a firm and a worker concluded a contract, they 
entered the second stage. At the second stage of the ICF- and the ICR-condition the worker had 
to determine his effort level. In the C-condition the computer automatically fixed the effort level 
at the contractually agreed upon level. During the second stage of the ICF- and the ICR-
condition we also asked the firms to indicate an expected effort level and how certain they were 
that their expectations would come true. 
In all conditions the firms were the contract makers, i.e., they could make contract offers 
to the workers. Workers could not make offers to the firms. A contract offer stipulated a wage w, 
a desired effort e~ and the identification (ID) number of the firm. Firms could make private or 
public offers. In case of a private offer, the firm also indicated the ID number of the worker with 
whom it wanted to trade and then only this worker was informed about the offer. In case of a 
public offer all workers and firms were informed about the offer. As a consequence, all workers 
could accept a public offer.  
In a given trading period a firm could make as many private and public offers as it 
wanted to make. However, as soon as a worker accepted one of the offers, the firm was matched 
with this worker and informed about the ID number of the worker. Once a firm’s offer was 
accepted all its other outstanding offers were immediately removed from the market so that they 
were no longer available. At any time during a trading period firms were also informed about 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Hence, ICF means Incomplete Contract Condition with Fixed IDs.  
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which workers were still in the market. This was done to prevent firms from making private 
offers to workers who had already concluded a contract with somebody else. 
Both in the C- and in the ICF-condition the status quo at the beginning of each period 
was that no worker had a job and no firm had its vacancy filled. Alternatively, we could have 
implemented the rule that a firm-worker relation automatically continues to hold unless one of 
the parties quits. Economically these two rules are equivalent if the parties are free to quit at the 
end of each period. Due to status quo effects (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988), however, the 
two rules may well have different behavioral effects. In our case the parties have to take actions 
to continue the relationship. The alternative rule calls for taking actions to dissolve the 
relationship. Therefore, status quo effects favor the formation of long-term relations under the 
alternative rule whereas our rule tends to weaken these effects. This means that our rule is less 
favorable to the emergence of long-term relations, making the actual emergence of long-term 
relations a stronger result.  
Some aspects of our experimental design are similar to the design in Kollock (1994) and in 
Kirchsteiger, Niederle and Potters (2001). Both of these papers also allow the traders to make 
private and public offers and to form long-run relations. The focus of both papers is, however, 
quite different. Kirchsteiger, Niederle and Potters (2001) examine the role of private and public 
offers exclusively in a context with complete contracts while our work focuses on how private or 
public offers are used to support enforcement strategies in the presence of a moral hazard 
problem. In Kollock (1994) the sellers fixed the actual quality of their goods before the start of a 
trading period but they were free to make false claims about the quality of the good. Kollock 
observes that quality uncertainty contributes to the formation of long-term relationships. The 
most important difference between Kollock’s work and ours is that we examine how the absence 
of third party enforcement affects contract terms and whether this leads to involuntary 
unemployment, how the contract terms are related to the firms’ enforcement strategies and to 
what extent the possibility of forming long-term relations enhances effort. In Kollock (1994) 
these features are absent.7  
 
                                                 
7 We parametrize the experiment such that there is a unique competitive equilibrium (with selfish preferences) while 
in Kollock – due to overlaps between supply and demand curves – every feasible price level that generates non-
negative profits constitutes a competitive equilibrium. This makes it impossible to detect Non-Walrasion 
outcomes because every division of the gains from trade is a Walrasian outcome. In addition, we implemented a 
finite horizon while Kollock did not tell the subjects how long the experiment would take. Thus he lost control 
over the subjects’ perceived time horizon. Another important difference is that in our experiments workers chose 
their effort level after they had been employed at a certain wage. This means that we examine ex-post 
opportunism while Kollock studies ex-ante opportunism. In our set-up the effort level could thus respond to the 
wage level within a given period. In Kollock’s set up sellers could not reciprocate high price offers in this way. 
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2.2 Parameters, Procedures, Information Conditions and Subject Pool 
In all three conditions we always had ten workers and seven firms, i.e., there was an excess 
supply of three workers. The material payoff of a firm was given by 
 
10⋅e – w,  if a contract was concluded 
(1)  πf =  
0,  if no contract was concluded. 
  
 
The material payoff of a worker was given by 
 
w – c(e),  if a contract was concluded 
(2)   πw =  
5,  if no contract was concluded, 
  
where c(e) denotes the cost of supplying effort.8 The unemployment benefit of a worker who did 
not trade was 5. The set of feasible effort levels was given by {1,2, …, 10} and wages had to be 
in the set {1,2, …, 100}. The cost schedule for the workers is depicted in Table 1. It shows that 
c(e) is strictly increasing and exhibits increasing marginal costs. Since the marginal cost of effort 
is at most 3 while the marginal revenue is always 10, the efficient effort level is given by e = 10. 
 
TABLE 1: Cost of effort schedule 
effort 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
cost 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
 
In the ICF- and the ICR-treatment firms had to indicate (i) the effort level they expect in the 
current trade and (ii) the uncertainty of their effort expectation. They indicated their uncertainty 
by choosing a number in the set {1,2, …, 7} where 1 represented complete uncertainty and 7 
complete certainty. Both the expected effort level and the uncertainty of their expectation had to 
be indicated after the contract was concluded but before the actual effort was revealed to the 
firm.  
                                                 
8 The experimental instructions were framed in a neutral goods market language. The reason for this was that most 
subjects know that in the labor market long-term relations are pervasive. Therefore, we thought that long-term 
relations emerge more easily if the experiment is framed in labor market terms. Thus, if long-term relations 
emerge in the context of a goods market frame we have a stronger result. Translated instructions for the ICF-
treatment are presented in Appendix 2.  
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The payoff functions (1) and (2), the number of firms and workers, the cost schedule c(e) 
and the fact that there were 15 trading periods were common knowledge. Only the pair of 
involved traders was informed about the actual payoffs and effort levels in the ICF and the ICR 
condition. In the course of a trading period each firm was also continuously informed about the 
public offers of the other firms. Similarly, a worker did not only know all the private offers 
addressed to him but also knew the public offers available.  
The experiment was computerized and conducted by using the software “z-tree” 
(Fischbacher 1999). In each condition the experiment lasted for 15 trading periods. The decisions 
in these periods had monetary consequences. To make the participants familiar with the bidding 
procedures there were also two additional practice periods before the actual experiment. In both 
practice periods subjects only went through the first (bidding) stage of the experiment and no 
money could be earned during these periods.9 At the end of each of the 15 paid trading periods 
each participant was informed about the contract (w, e~ ) he or she had concluded, about e, their 
own payoff, the payoff of the trading partner and the ID number of the trading partner. Then the 
participants wrote this information on a separate sheet of paper. This procedure ensured that each 
participant was always fully informed about his or her own trading history. 
In total 238 subjects participated in our experiments. We conducted five sessions in the 
ICF-condition, five sessions in the C-condition and four sessions in the ICR-condition. No 
subject participated in more than one session. A session lasted, on average, 90 minutes. Subjects 
were students from the University of Zurich and the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich. 
On average, a subject earned CHF 62.3 (∼$ 42 at that time) in an experimental session. 
 
3. Predictions 
For the predictions it is crucial that all participants know that the experiment will end right after 
period 15. In case that rationality and selfishness of all participants is common knowledge, it is 
easy to derive a solution: In each period of the ICR and in the final period of the ICF each 
worker will choose the minimal effort e = 1 irrespective of the accepted contract (w, e~ ). 
Therefore, contract offers with w = 5 are optimal for the firms.10 All seven contract offers will be 
accepted. By backward induction the same outcome will be obtained in all previous periods of 
                                                 
9 Since the practice periods did not involve any payments the workers would have had no real effort costs in these 
periods. This would have allowed them to fool the firms with regard to their true willingness to provide effort. To 
prevent this we did not conduct the second stage in the practice periods.  
10 Since w had to be an integer, w = 6 is optimal if w = 5 is rejected by the workers. For empirical purposes this 
difference is, however, negligible. 
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the ICF. Thus in the ICF and the ICR condition a very inefficient outcome will be obtained and 
the resulting small surplus per trade, πf + πw – 5 = (10⋅1-5) + (5-0) – 5 = 5, will be reaped by the 
firms.  
In the C-condition the experimenter enforces every feasible effort level, i. e., also the 
maximum effort e = 10. At e = 10 the workers have opportunity costs of 5 + c(10) = 23. 
Therefore the profit maximizing contract offer in t =15 is w = 23 and e~  = 10. In equilibrium, all 
workers will accept this offer.11 In the C-condition the total surplus is given by 100 – 23 = 77 
which, in equilibrium, is again fully reaped by the firms in each of the 15 periods. Thus, if 
rationality and selfishness of all participants is common knowledge we should observe w = 5, e = 
1 and 7 trades in all periods of the two incomplete contract conditions, whereas in the C-
condition w = 23, e = 10 and 7 trades should be observed in every period. Moreover, in all three 
conditions the firms should be indifferent between making private and public offers because 
selfish workers will accept any offer that gives them a positive payoff. This also means that we 
should observe no systematic differences in the share of private offers across treatments. Finally, 
there is also no reason for any party to engage in long-term relations. Nothing can be gained by 
entering a long-term relationship because in the incomplete contract conditions the effort will be 
minimal in any case while in the C-condition it will be e = 10 even in a short term encounter. 
Thus there should be no systematic differences in the relative frequency of long-term relations 
across the C- and the ICF-condition. 
If, however, rationality or selfishness of all traders is not common knowledge very 
different outcomes may occur because reputation building may become profitable12. If, for 
example, the firms in the ICF condition believe that there are sufficiently many fair types among 
the workers, it may be possible to sustain non-minimal effort levels for many periods in the ICF 
condition. Fair players respond to friendly actions in a friendly manner and they retaliate in 
response to hostile actions even when these responses are costly for them. These friendly and 
hostile responses also prevail in one-shot situations.13 Thus, fairness means that an increase in 
the generosity of a contract offer is reciprocated by an increase in the effort level even in a pure 
one-shot transaction. In our context the generosity of the contract offer can be measured by the 
current rent, πW(w, e~ ) – 5 = w – c( e~ ) – 5, that is implied by the offer. It is well known from 
                                                 
11 Since w had to be an integer there is also an equilibrium at w = 24.  
12 For a model of reputation building see, e.g., Kreps et. al (1982). 
13 See Rabin (1993) for this definition of reciprocal fairness. Recently several new models of social preferences have 
been developed that are consistent with reciprocal responses in one-shot interactions (Levine 1998, Dufwenberg 
and Kirchsteiger 1999, Falk and Fischbacher 1999, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000, Charness 
and Rabin 2000). For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to go into the details of the motives that may 
generate reciprocal responses. For our purposes it is important that a fraction of the subjects exhibits reciprocal 
behavior in one-shot interactions while the precise source of this behavior does not interest us here.  
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numerous experiments that many people do in fact have a propensity to behave in a reciprocally 
fair manner in one-shot encounters (see, e.g., Camerer and Thaler 1995, Roth 1995, Fehr and 
Gächter 2000, Camerer forthcoming).  
In Appendix 1 we use the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to show that – in the presence 
of sufficiently many fair subjects – there is an equilibrium in the ICF in which all the workers 
provide non-minimal effort levels in the first 14 periods while in period 15 only the fair types 
perform at non-minimal levels.14 We also show that in the ICF higher average effort levels can 
be enforced in equilibrium than in the ICR because of the possibility of forming long-term 
relations in the ICF. The key mechanism in our argument is the existence of a positive rent for 
the workers in the final period of the ICF. A rent exists if a worker with a job earns strictly more 
than a worker without a job. In our context the rent is generated by the existence of fair workers. 
Since they respond to generous contract offers with generous effort levels they make it profitable 
for the firms to pay rents in the final period. Due to this rent it is possible to discipline the selfish 
workers in the first 14 periods, i.e., the selfish workers mimic the behavior of the fair workers so 
that their type is not revealed in the first 14 periods.15  
If workers earn a positive rent in the final period of the ICF condition the threat to 
terminate the trading relation at the end of period 14 induces a selfish worker to bear positive 
effort costs in period 14. As long as the effort cost c( e~ ) are below the expected rent in period 15, 
the worker will be willing to provide e~  in period 14. Note that it is the expected future rent 
which disciplines the worker in period 14 while the current rent that is paid in period 14 is 
completely irrelevant for the effort choice of a selfish worker. As long as the selfish worker 
believes that the provision of the desired effort level is rewarded with the continuation of the 
relation in t = 15, he will provide e = e~  in period 14, irrespective of the current rent in period 14. 
This raises the question why the firm does not pay a very low or no rent in period 14 but 
“promises” to pay a substantial rent in period 15. Yet, if the worker believes that a low rent in 
period 14 is a signal that the relation will be terminated at the end of the period the current rent 
in period 14 will also affect the incentives for the worker in period 14. A low current rent in 
period 14 is then essentially a signal that there will be no future rent and thus the selfish worker 
has no longer an incentive to perform in period 14.16  
                                                 
14 We use the Fehr-Schmidt model because it is easy to apply in our context and captures some aspects of reciprocal 
behavior in a simple way. We do not regard our experiments as the appropriate environment for testing different 
fairness models. Other fairness models probably generate very similar equilibrium behaviors in our context.  
15 The fair workers need not be disciplined because they are willing to provide high effort levels in period t as long 
as they receive sufficiently generous offers in period t.  
16 Our argument here is essentially an application of an argument in MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) to the context 
of a finitely repeated game. A crucial point in MacLeod and Malcomson (1998) is that firms cannot extract the 
future rents of the workers up-front by paying low wages or by charging entrance fees in the current period if this 
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In a world in which fairness is a prominent concern, the belief that a low current rent 
signals the absence of future rents seems quite natural. A low wage may be taken as an 
indication that the firm is not much concerned about fairness and why should an unfair firm not 
also break her promise and change the trading partner in the next period? Whatever the source of 
the worker’s belief is, as long as a low rent is believed to signal the termination of the relation at 
the end of the current period, the firm has an incentive to pay a high rent in the current period 
because this induces the selfish worker to perform in the current period. Yet, if the selfish worker 
also receives a current rent in t = 14 the total expected income loss from the termination of the 
relation at the end of period 13 is even higher because the fired worker may lose rents for two 
periods. Thus, in period 13 and all the previous periods, even higher effort levels are enforceable 
by the threat of terminating the relationship.  
The above argument rests on the possibility that firms and workers can form long-term 
relations. By design the ICR rules out that firms can ensure the reemployment of previous 
workers. Therefore, in the ICR selfish workers cannot be disciplined and, as a consequence, the 
average effort will be lower. The above argument also provides an equilibrium account for why 
firms may want to rely on private offers in the ICF. Since a long-term relation cannot be 
established through public offers, because every worker can accept a public offer, firms who 
want to maintain a long-term relation will rely on private offers.17  
What is the potential impact of fair types in the C-condition? Since in the C-condition the 
contract enforcement problem is absent there is no need for the firms to discipline the workers 
and, hence, there is no need for the firms to offer rents to induce non-minimal effort choices. As 
a consequence, there is also no reason to enter into long-term relations and to rely on private 
offers. In fact, the existence of fair players may even provide a reason for the firms to rely 
primarily on public offers. This is so because a fair player is willing to reject offers that are 
perceived as unfair if the rejection decreases the firm’s payoff with a sufficiently high 
probability. In contrast, a selfish player will accept any offer that gives him a positive material 
payoff. In case that the firms believe that there is a fraction of fair workers, and in case that the 
types of the workers have not yet been revealed, the firms have an incentive to make public 
                                                                                                                                                             
induces a belief that there will also be low wages (i.e., no rents) in the future. Given this belief, workers reduce 
their effort in the current period if they receive low wages in the current period. Note that in our context the belief 
is slightly different. If the workers do not receive a rent in the current period this is taken as a signal that the 
relation will be terminated at the end of the period.  
17 Our rationale for long-term relations in the ICF is certainly not the only possible one. For example, it is well 
known, that reputation building may occur even in situations where there are in fact no fair players but some 
players believe that there are fair players (see, e.g., Kreps et al. 1982). It may then be profitable for selfish players 
to behave as if they had a preference for fairness. Thus, it may be possible to construct somewhat similar 
equilibria as the one we have constructed even if there is only a very small number of fair subjects.  
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offers because by making a public offer they can ensure that the selfish players can also accept 
their offers. Public offers are thus likely to increase the probability that low offers are accepted.  
Our discussion has shown that in the presence of fair types long-term relations may be part 
of an equilibrium even in finitely repeated games like the ICF. However, it is well known that in 
repeated games there is typically a large number of equilibria and our ICF-condition is no 
exemption. Thus, it could be that the actual behavior of the subjects in our experiment deviates 
from the one outlined above simply because subjects play a different equilibrium.18 The plethora 
of equilibria in repeated games makes it all the more necessary to study the actual behavior of 
subjects in repeated settings. However, despite the limited predictive power of repeated game 
models they are in our view very useful for heuristic purposes because the behavioral patterns 
that prevail in particular equilibria suggests particular testable hypotheses. For instance, the 
equilibrium we described for the ICF suggests to test the hypotheses that private offers and long 
run relations will be more frequent in the ICF compared to the C-condition, that effort 
enforcement in the ICF is based on the threat of terminating the relation in case of malfeasance, 
that effort in the ICF is higher than in the ICR, that current rents are shared in the ICF but not in 
the C-condition, etc. Thus, although the non-uniqueness of the equilibrium renders precise 
quantitative predictions impossible, focusing on particular equilibria provides fruitful qualitative 
hypotheses.  
 
4. Results 
Since there were seven firms, ten workers and 15 periods in each session the total number of 
potential trades is 105. In the five ICF-sessions we observed in total 523 trades, in the five C-
sessions there were 519 trades and in the four ICR sessions we had 417 trades. This indicates 
that the potential number of trades was (almost) completely exhausted in all sessions.  
 
4.1. The Nature of Market Interactions 
Our first result concerns the nature of the bidding process in those two conditions where long-
term relations were possible. The question is whether contractual incompleteness induces a 
different pattern of private versus public offers compared to the C-condition. The evidence on 
this question can be summarized in  
 
                                                 
18 There is, of course, also the possibility that subjects do not play any equilibrium.  
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Result 1: In the ICF-condition the large majority of trades is initiated by private offers while in 
the C-condition public offers initiate the large majority of the trades. 
 
Figure 1 provides support for R1. It depicts the evolution of the relative share of trades in both 
the ICF- and the C-condition that are initiated by private offers. The figure shows that 
throughout all the periods the relative share of privately initiated trades is substantially larger in 
the ICF-condition. In the first two periods the difference across conditions is roughly 10 
percentage points. After period two, the difference becomes much larger and in the final five 
periods it varies between 60 and 70 percentage points. This change over time is mainly due to 
the strong increase in the relative share of privately initiated trades in the ICF-condition. After 
period seven this share is almost always above 80 percent and reaches even 90 percent. Thus 
Figure 1 unambiguously shows that private offers are the preferred choice in the ICF-condition 
while public offers are the preferred choice in the C-condition. 
 
FIGURE 1: Relative share of trades initiated by private offers under complete and incomplete 
contracts 
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Figure 1 shows the aggregate picture if we average over all five ICF- and C-sessions. Despite 
some variability within the ICF- and the C-sessions similar results also hold for the individual 
sessions. To show this similarity we have computed the relative share of trades that are initiated 
by private offers for each session. Across the ICF-sessions the relative share of private offers 
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varies between 61 and 90 percent while in the C-sessions it varies between 9 and 43 percent. A 
non-parametric Mann Whitney test, with the relative shares in each session as the observations, 
indicates that this difference is significant at the 1 percent level (p = 0.009).  
R1 suggests that in the C-condition firms do not care much about the identity of their 
trading partner since they predominantly make public offers. They just seem to be interested in 
finding a trading partner regardless of the partner’s identity. In the ICF-condition, however, the 
worker’s identity seems to matter a lot because in most cases firms make private offers. Our next 
result provides evidence in favor of this interpretation.  
 
Result 2: Firms addressed the majority of private offers to their previous employees. The 
probability of making a private offer to the previous employee is higher the higher the 
employee’s effort in the previous period, the lower the negative surprise relative to 
the firm’s expected effort level and the higher the positive surprise relative to the 
firm’s expected effort level. 
 
Support for R2 comes from Tables 2 and 3 and Figure 2. Table 2 displays the evolution of the 
frequency of private offers to the previous trading partner relative to all the private offers. It 
indicates that the clear majority of private offers goes to the previous worker. After period five 
between 60 and 79 percent of all the private offers go to the previous workers. This can be taken 
as a first indication that the firms are interested in forming long-term relations with particular 
workers. 
 
TABLE 2: Evolution of private offers to the previous employee relative to all the private offers 
Period 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Percent 41.7 40.0 52.6 48.5 66.7 72.0 60.0 72.0 60.0 71.4 78.6 75.9 61.1 69.2 
 
Firms’ interest in forming a long-term relation with a worker depends crucially on the worker’s 
performance. R2 means that firms condition contract renewal on the worker’s effort choice. 
Figure 2 reveals that there is indeed a very strong positive relation between the probability that 
the previous worker receives a private offer and his effort choice. For effort levels below seven 
this probability is roughly 0.2 or less while for e ≥ 7 it is substantially above 0.5. If the worker 
provided the maximum effort in t-1 the probability of getting a new offer in t is close to 1.  
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FIGURE 2: Probability of a private offer to the previous worker as a function  
of the worker’s effort (ICF-treatment) 
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Figure 2 strongly suggests that the firms adopted a policy of contingent contract renewal: High 
and satisfactory performance was rewarded with a new private offer while in case of low and 
unsatisfactory performance the probability of “firing” was quite high. Further evidence for this 
interpretation is given in Table 3. The table presents the results of a probit-regression that 
regresses the probability of a private offer to the previous worker on the worker’s previous 
effort, on positive and negative surprise, on the previous length of the relationship controlling for 
session fixed effects. In the table we show the robust standard errors for each coefficient 
estimate. These standard errors provide very conservative significance tests because they are 
based on the assumption that only the observations across the five ICF-sessions are statistically 
independent while for the observations within each session no independence is assumed. Table 3 
shows a strong and significant positive impact of the previous effort. In addition, if the worker 
provided effort in excess of what the firm expected (positive surprise) the probability increases 
significantly while if the firm’s expectation was disappointed (negative surprise) the probability 
decreases. Interestingly, the previous length of the firm-worker relation is also highly significant. 
This provides a first indication that long-term relations give rise to relation-specific reputational 
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capital making firms reluctant to fire workers with whom they have interacted more often in the 
past. We will take up this issue in more detail in R8 below.  
 
TABLE 3: Probability of making a private offer to the previous worker in the ICF-treatment 
Effort in previous period .125** (.052) 
Positive surprise .192** (.077) 
Negative surprise -.836** (.381) 
Previous length 2.449*** (.653) 
constant -5.045*** (1.535) 
 N = 488 
 LL = -41.93 
 Waldχ(3) = 11.89 
 Prob = .000 
 Pseudo R2 = .8747 
Note: The estimation procedure is a probit regression with robust standard errors (in 
parentheses). The regression includes dummies to control for session effects. *** indicates 
significance at the 1-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level and * at the 10-percent level, 
respectively. 
 
 
We also ran separate probit regressions for the individual sessions. Yet, the general pattern is the 
same across sessions.19 Thus, taken together these results suggest that the firms followed a 
contingent renewal policy but in case of a long lasting relation the probability of firing for 
malfeasance was generally lower. 
R2 strongly suggests that in the ICF-condition the firms were interested in keeping the 
same worker if the worker provided high effort levels that met the firms’ expectations. The next 
question then is whether the firms were successful in establishing long-term relations. Our next 
result provides an answer. 
 
Result 3: In the C-condition the vast majority of trades takes place in one-shot transactions 
while in the ICF-condition the majority of trades takes place in long lasting relations. 
 
Support for R3 is given in Figure 3. The figure presents the cumulative frequency of trades in 
firm-worker relations of different length in the C- and the ICF-condition. As one can see, more 
than 70 percent of all the trades in the C-condition took place in one-shot encounters and 90 
                                                 
19 We also experimented with “shirking”, i.e., e < e~ and excess effort (e ≥ e~ ) as regressors. It turns out, however, 
that when previous effort is included, shirking and excess effort are sometimes bad explanatory variables while 
positive and negative surprise are always significant and have the expected sign. 
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percent of the trades took place in interactions that lasted one or two periods. This differs sharply 
from the ICF condition in which only one third of the trades took place in one-shot encounters 
and roughly 50 percent of the trades took place in relations that lasted for four or more 
consecutive periods. Moreover, roughly 40 percent of the trades in the ICF took place in 
relations that lasted 8 or more periods. 
 
FIGURE 3: Cumulative frequency of trades in relationships of different lengths  
in the C- and the ICF-treatment 
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A similar picture emerges at the session level. To show this result we computed for each 
trade how long the trading parties had stayed together previous to the respective trade. Then we 
took the average “length of the relation previous to the trade” for each session. It turns out that in 
all five C-sessions this measure is lower than in each of the five ICF-sessions. Thus, the 
difference across treatments is significant (p = 0.009, Mann Whitney test).  
Most one-shot encounters in the ICF-condition took place in early periods. In period two 
and period three the separation rate, i.e., the rate at which the traders change their trading 
partners is slightly more than 60 percent. The separation rate sharply declines after period three 
(eventually reaching a level of about 20 percent). This suggests that at the beginning there was a 
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search phase during which the traders attempted to find a good match, and once they had found 
one they tended to continue the relation. 
 
Result 4: In the ICF-condition there is little disagreement about contract terms while in the C-
condition many offers are not accepted by the workers. 
 
Support for R4 comes from Figure 4, which shows the average number of offers per session that 
are in excess of the number of trades. The figure illustrates that – except for the first five periods 
– there are typically only one or two excess offers in an ICF-session. Thus, after period five of an 
ICF-session there were typically only 8 or 9 offers per period and seven of them were accepted. 
The small number of excess offers in the ICF indicates that most offers led directly to a trade so 
that little disagreement about contract conditions occurred.  
 
FIGURE 4: Evolution of the number of excess offers per session in the C- and the ICF-treatment 
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In the C-condition the picture is quite different. The number of excess offers per period is 
rarely below six and after period 5 there is a strong increase in the number of excess offers per 
period reaching 14 excess offers in the final period. Thus, in the C-condition there occurs much 
more disagreement about contract terms. Firms predominantly made public offers and the 
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workers did not accept many of these offers. As a consequence, firms gradually had to improve 
their offers until workers accepted them.  
The temporal pattern of acceptance within a period was also a very different across 
conditions. In the ICF-condition most offers were immediately accepted so that the trading 
periods quickly ended. In contrast, in the C-condition the time limit for the trading period was 
virtually always exhausted. By not accepting the prevailing offers the workers put pressure on 
the firms to improve their offers because – due to the time limit – firms were afraid that they 
might not be able to trade.  
The aggregate results illustrated in Figure 4 are quite representative for the individual 
sessions. In the C-sessions the number of excess offers per session varies between 85 and 204 
while in the ICF-sessions we observed only between 16 and 38 excess offers per session. 
Therefore, this difference across conditions is significant (p = 0.009, Mann Whitney test).  
Taken together the first four results show that contractual incompleteness causes markets to 
function very differently compared to the complete contract condition. If effort enforcement is 
no problem most transactions are one-shot and the firms do not care about the identity of the 
trading partner. In addition there is a lot of disagreement about contract conditions as indicated 
by the number of excess offers. If third parties cannot enforce the effort, the firms care a lot 
about the identity of the trading partners. Firms establish long-term relations with reliable 
workers by implementing a policy of contingent contract renewal. After an initial phase during 
which firms search for reliable workers, one-shot encounters are relatively infrequent and little 
disagreement about contract conditions occurs. In most cases the firms make just one offer to 
one of the workers and this offer is accepted. Moreover, the evidence indicates that long-term 
relations make firms, ceteris paribus, more reluctant to fire workers suggesting the existence of 
relation-specific reputational capital. All these differences in market interactions across 
conditions can be attributed to contractual incompleteness. However, we do not yet know the 
precise reasons and consequences of the firms’ contingent renewal policy and the resulting long-
term relations in the ICF.  
 
4.2 Reasons and Consequences of Contingent Contract Renewals and Long-Term Relations 
Why did the firms predominantly rely on private offers in the ICF-condition while in the C-
condition public offers prevailed? In view of the large differences across conditions one would 
conjecture that the relative profitability of private offers differs across conditions. Our next result 
shows that this in fact holds. 
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Result 5: Except for the final period, private offers are much more profitable than public offers 
for the firms in the ICF-condition. In contrast, in the C-condition private offers are 
less profitable for the firms than public offers. Irrespective of the type of the offer, 
firms make higher profits in the C-condition compared to the ICF-condition. 
 
R5 is supported by Figure 5, which presents the evolution of the firms’ average profits in trades 
initiated by different types of offers across conditions. In the ICF the profit from a private offer 
varies between 26 and 40 in the first 14 periods while the profit from a public offer varies 
between 3 and 27. Only in the final period the profit from a private offer is comparably small. 
These profit differences are significant. If we regress the firms’ profit per trade in the ICF on a 
constant and a dummy for “private offer” the coefficient for the dummy is 16.8 and significant at 
the 1 percent level. In contrast to the ICF, in the C-sessions private offers are less profitable. If 
we perform the same regression for the C-condition, the results indicate a significant (p < 0.08) 
and negative impact of the private offer dummy.20 Thus it was indeed more profitable to make 
private offers in the ICF while in the C-condition public offers were more profitable.  
In the C-condition profits steadily rise over time. Towards the end the profit from a public 
offer stabilizes around πf = 70. Note that the gains from trade, which are given by 10e – c(e) – 5, 
can be at most 10⋅10-18-5 = 77. If a firm earns πf = 70 the workers’ share of the gains from trade 
can be at most equal to 7. This indicates that the distribution of the gains from trade was quite 
uneven in the C-condition. The uneven payoff distribution provides a reason for why there were 
so many offers in excess of the number of trades in the C-condition. Over time the firms in the 
C-condition made worse offers which the workers frequently hesitated to accept (see Figure 4). 
Nevertheless the increasing profits per trade over time indicate that the firms were ultimately 
successful in enforcing low gains from trade for the workers. 
 
                                                 
20 All significance tests are based on robust standard errors that assume that observations across sessions, but not 
within sessions, are independent.  
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FIGURE 5: Firms’ average profits in trades initiated by private or public offers in the C- and the 
ICF-treatment 
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There are in our view two potential reasons why the firms implemented a contingent renewal 
policy. One reason is purely psychological and has to do with fairness concerns. If, in response 
to a generous offer with a high effort demand, a worker shirks it seems quite natural that the firm 
feels cheated. Reciprocal fairness then dictates to punish the worker by not renewing his 
contract. The other reason for a contingent renewal policy is economic because by making the 
renewal of the contract contingent on the worker’s satisfactory performance the firm may create 
a material incentive for contract enforcement. This material incentive exists, however, only if the 
denial of contract renewal imposes a loss on the workers. It is, therefore, important to examine 
whether those workers who did not get their contract renewed faced a loss.  
Result 6: In all periods the denial of contract renewal imposed costs on the workers.  
To examine this question we have computed for every period t a proxy for the total rents of the 
trading workers. For this purpose we computed the average of all present and future incomes of 
those workers who traded in period t. The average income of a worker, who trades in t, over all 
periods from t to T = 15 measures the average value of a job in t. We denote this value by Vte (e 
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stands for “employed”). In addition, we computed the average value of being without a job in 
period t which we denote by Vtu (u stands for “unemployed”). Vtu is given by the average income 
of a worker, who is unemployed in period t, from period t to T = 15. The difference Vte - Vtu 
represents a proxy for the total rent of a worker who is employed in t. Table 4 shows the 
evolution of Vte - Vtu over time. It turns out that this expression is positive in all 15 periods. 
 
TABLE 4: Total rents of trading workers 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Vte - Vtu 102 50 66 113 148 105 139 110 99 95 91 79 71 42 27 
 
This implies that, in any period t, the denial of contract renewal imposed a cost on the 
worker. To see this assume that a worker, who does not get an offer in period t from his previous 
firm, finds another trading partner in period t with probability µ < 1.21 The worker’s expected 
future income is thus µVte + (1-µ)Vtu. If, instead, the worker can trade for sure in period t with his 
previous firm his expected future income is Vte. Therefore, by not renewing the contract, the firm 
can impose an expected loss of (1-µ)(Vte - Vtu) on the worker. Note also that the probability of 
not getting a new trading partner, (1-µ), is the higher the larger the number of bilateral long-term 
relations in the market. R6 also means that employed workers were on the average always better 
off than unemployed workers. Unemployment was thus involuntary in the sense that unemployed 
workers would have strictly preferred a job at the prevailing wages.  
Irrespective of the reason for the contingent renewal policy of the firms in the ICF-
condition R6 implies that this policy created material incentives for the workers to provide non-
minimal effort levels. It is, therefore, interesting to examine to what extent the material 
incentives that are present in the ICF contributed to the provision of high effort levels. We can 
examine this by comparing the effort levels between the ICF- and the ICR-condition because in 
the ICR no such material incentives were present.  
 
Result 7: The effort level in the ICF-condition is much higher compared to the ICR-condition. 
The effort level is highest in the C-condition. 
 
                                                 
21 Let nt denote the number of workers who trade with the previous firm in period t. 10 - nt denotes the workers who 
are in the market and search for a job in period t and 7 - nt is the number of firms who do not trade with their 
previous worker and search for another worker in t. Then a worker who is denied contract renewal in period t has 
probability µt = (6 - nt)/(9 - nt) < 1 of trading with another firm.  
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Evidence for R7 is given in Figure 6, which presents the evolution of average effort in all three 
conditions. There are several remarkable features in this figure. First, in all the periods there is a 
clear order. Effort is highest in the C-condition, second highest in the ICF-condition and lowest 
in the ICR-condition. We find it particularly remarkable that the possibility of forming long-term 
relations and of implementing a policy of contingent renewal in the ICF-condition leads to a 
higher effort compared to the ICR-condition already in period one. Second, over time there is a 
substantial increase in the average effort level in the ICF-condition. Third, in the final period 
there is a substantial drop in the average effort level in the ICF-condition. This is consistent with 
the view that the selfish workers can be disciplined by the threat of firing only during the pre-
final periods.  
 
FIGURE 6: Evolution of average effort over time 
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Figure 6 suggests that when there is an excess supply of workers, contingent renewal 
policies are a very effective device for the elicitation of high effort levels. While in the ICR-
condition the average effort was rarely above e = 4, firms in the ICF could enforce between e = 7 
and e = 8 most of the time. These differences also emerge at the level of individual trades (see 
Figure 7). In the ICR-condition the maximum effort was rarely achieved and the most frequent 
effort level was e = 1. In 43 percent of all the trades the workers chose the minimal effort in the 
ICR-condition and in 36 percent of the trades the workers provided between e = 4 and e = 7. In 
less than 6 percent of the trades e ≥ 8 is achieved in the ICR-condition. The ICF-condition 
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sharply differs from this because in 36 percent of the trades the maximum effort is achieved and 
in another 29 percent of the trades e is between 7 and 9. The maximum effort is the mode in this 
condition. These effort differences across conditions are statistically significant (p = 0.028, Mann 
Whitney test with the average effort per session as the unit of analysis).  
 
 
FIGURE 7: Distribution of effort in the ICF- and the ICR-condition 
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From Table 3 we know that the previous length of the relation had a large and highly significant 
positive impact on the probability of making an offer to the previous worker. Thus, for the same 
past effort level and the same level of positive or negative surprise a worker who has been 
together with a firm for more periods was more likely to be reemployed by the firm. In economic 
terms this makes only sense if firms value longer lasting relationships more highly. Recall that – 
in the presence of a policy of contingent renewal – workers in longer lasting relations performed 
on the average better in the past. Thus these workers actually exhibited a higher degree of 
trustworthiness. In our view there are at least two reasons why a firm may infer from past 
trustworthy behavior that a worker will also exhibit trustworthy behavior in the present period. 
First, past trustworthy behavior may be taken as an indication that the worker has fairness 
preferences that favor cooperation – the worker is seen as intrinsically more trustworthy. Second, 
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past trustworthy behavior may be seen as an indication that the firm and the worker have arrived 
at a viable implicit agreement based on repeated interaction incentives. Note that in our context 
the establishment of an implicit agreement is far from obvious – necessitating a lot of trust and 
belief coordination that cannot be taken for granted. For example, if a firm offers a generous 
wage in combination with a high desired effort level, the firm may end up with a high loss if the 
worker shirks. Likewise, a worker who performs well because he hopes to be reemployed may 
regret this choice if he is in fact not reemployed next period. Thus, the mutual trust that helps to 
establish implicit agreements may be viewed as a relation-specific asset that renders firms 
reluctant to fire their workers.  
If it is indeed the case that longer lasting relations increased the firms’ trust into their 
worker we should observe that, on the average, firms in longer lasting relations expect higher 
effort levels and experience less uncertainty with regard to the effort level. Recall that in each 
period firms indicated their expected effort level and the uncertainty of their expectation, which 
enables us to examine these questions.  
 
Result 8: In the ICF-condition, during the initial periods of a long run relation firms’ expected 
effort and the actual effort are strongly increasing in the length of the relationship 
while firms’ subjective uncertainty about the effort is strongly decreasing. With an 
increasing length of the relation the increase in expected and actual effort and the 
decrease in subjective uncertainty become weaker.  
 
We provide support for R8 by means of Figure 8. The figure plots expected effort, actual effort 
and subjective uncertainty about the effort as a function of the previous duration of the trading 
relation.22 The figure illustrates that firms expected a strong rise in effort between period 1 and 
period 4 of a relationship. Between period 5 and 8 the increase is less strong. Moreover, the 
actual effort level shows an equally remarkable time pattern. It roughly matches the expected 
effort level indicating that the value of a relationship indeed increases with the length of the 
relation. This pattern of the actual effort level provides a rationale for the increase in actual effort 
over time in the ICF – as illustrated in Figure 6. In the course of the ICF-sessions long-term 
relations became more frequent which led to the observed increase in effort over time. Further 
evidence for an increase in the value of a relationship over time is provided by the strong 
decrease in the subjective uncertainty with respect to the expected the effort level (see Figure 8). 
                                                 
22 Note that when firms indicate the expected effort and their subjective certainty they are (in the current period) 
already matched again with a worker. Therefore, in Figure 8 the variable “previous length of the relation” also 
includes the current period. R8 also holds, however, if we exclude the current period.  
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Recall that firms indicated complete uncertainty by the number 1 and complete certainty by the 
number 7. For relationships that last between 4 and 14 periods the average uncertainty of firms is 
always between 6 and 7 which suggest a very high amount of trust.  
Another interesting feature of Figure 8 is the reduction in expected and actual effort and the 
increase in subjective uncertainty towards the end of the experiment. Note that very long 
relations are more likely to include the final period. In the final period many firms expected a 
significant decrease in effort levels and an increase in subjective uncertainty, and the actual 
effort levels did indeed decrease in the final period (see Figure 6). This is an indication that a 
non-trivial part of the trust that was exhibited in the non-final periods of the relations was built 
on incentives arising from repeated interactions. However, as we will see in our discussion of R9 
and R10 below there is also evidence that intrinsic trustworthiness in the form of fairness 
preferences has played a role.  
 
FIGURE 8: The average values of expected effort, actual effort and subjective uncertainty about 
effort as a function of the previous length of the relation (ICF-treatment) 
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R8 suggests that – apart from the reduced trust taking place in the final period of the experiment 
– long-term relations were characterized by a higher degree of trust and trustworthiness than 
short-term relations. This provides a reason for an important part of R3, i.e., for the firms’ 
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reluctance to fire workers with whom they had interacted more often in the past. Thus, this part 
of R3 in combination with R8 indicates that reputational assets were created in long-term 
relations, which contributed to the bilateralization of the market. 
Our previous results show that the parties in the ICF had strong reasons to form long-term 
relations. Yet, how did they manage to establish the necessary trust? After all firms and workers 
who wanted to establish a long-term relation had to solve a complex problem. How could a firm 
signal to the worker that it was interested in maintaining the relationship in case of satisfactory 
performance? How could a worker signal that he was interested in getting an offer from the same 
firm again? For the worker the problem seems to be easier because by providing the maximum 
effort or by providing a higher effort than requested by the firm the worker could recommend 
himself to the firm. For the firm, however, the problem seems more difficult. One method could 
be a generous contract offer. By making a generous offer and demanding a high effort level the 
firm might be able to communicate the willingness to make a generous offer to the worker again 
in the next period provided the worker’s performance is satisfactory. Recall that making a 
generous offer exposes the firm to a considerable risk because if the worker shirks the firm 
incurs a loss. But perhaps it is exactly this exposure to the risk of shirking that makes the firm’s 
signal “psychologically credible”. If a generous offer increases the credibility of a contingent 
renewal policy one would expect that, for a given desired effort level, there is a positive relation 
between the wage and the worker’s effort. The reason is that, if the worker’s belief in a policy of 
contingent renewal is fostered by a generous contract offer, the worker faces, subjectively, 
stronger material incentives to perform well. One would expect, however, also a positive 
correlation between wage and effort if there are fair types among the workers.  
Another method to foster the worker’s belief in a contingent renewal policy could be to 
initiate the trade by a private offer. From an economic viewpoint it seems at first sight irrelevant 
for the credibility of the policy whether trading is initiated via a private or a public offer. 
However, if private offers are interpreted as a signal that the firm is interested in a long-term 
relation the worker might be more willing to provide a high effort level. If this is the case we 
should observe that a private offer increases the worker’s effort choice in the ICF. Alternatively, 
private offers may have a purely psychological effect on workers’ effort choices that have 
nothing to do with the credibility of signaling a contingent renewal policy. The mere fact that in 
a situation of excess supply of workers a firm singles out a particular worker may render the 
worker grateful, which in turn may raise his effort. If this argument is empirically relevant we 
should observe that private offers raise effort in the ICF and in the ICR. To examine the above 
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hypotheses about the various determinants of the workers’ effort choices, we ran several 
regressions. The results of these regressions can be summarized as follows. 
  
Result 9: Both in the ICF- and the ICR-condition the actual effort chosen by the worker is 
positively related to the wage and to the private offer dummy. The firm’s desired 
effort has no effect on the actual effort. The previous length of the trading relation 
increases the effort in the ICF. 
 
The regressions supporting R9 are presented in Table 5. Since the effort cannot be lower than 1, 
nor higher than 10 and since in the ICF (ICR) many effort choices are at the upper (lower) 
boundary we used a censored regression technique. In addition, we report robust standard errors 
that also allow for heteroskedasticity. Both in the regression for the ICF- and the ICR-condition 
we control for session effects by including session dummies and for period effects by including 
period dummies. The period dummies constitute suitable controls for the endgame effect 
observed in the ICF. In the regressions for the ICF- and the ICR-condition the coefficients on 
“wage” and “private offer” are positive and highly significant while “desired effort” is 
insignificant. The result for the ICF-regression is thus consistent with the hypothesis that in the 
ICF a higher wage and a private offer foster the credibility of the firm’s contingent renewal 
policy. However, the fact that “wage” and “private offer” are also significantly positive in the 
ICR suggests that fairness concerns shape effort behavior, too.  
In the regression for the ICF “previous length” is significantly positive indicating that 
workers’ trustworthiness increases with the length of the relation. This increase in 
trustworthiness may be due to the fact that a worker’s experience with a firm’s contingent 
renewal policy enhances the credibility of the renewal policy thus providing better pecuniary 
incentives for the worker. The increase may, however, also be due to a loyalty effect. Perhaps the 
trust that arises from the repeated experience of being reemployed induces workers to become 
more loyal to their firms, i.e., they are more willing to take their firm’s interests into account 
when choosing the effort level. If this conjecture is true then we should observe that – in the final 
period – workers who had been in a longer relation with their firms provide – ceteris paribus – 
higher effort levels because in the final period pecuniary incentives are absent. To test this we 
ran the same regression as in Table 5 with the data from period 15 of the ICF. It turns out that 
even in period 15 the coefficient for “previous length” is positive and significant (p = 0.016) 
suggesting the existence of a loyalty effect. This loyalty effect may also explain why in the final 
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period of the ICF average effort is considerably higher than in the final period of the ICR (see 
Figure 6). 
 
 
TABLE 5: Determinants of effort in the conditions with incomplete contracts  
Dependent variable: effort 
 ICF-treatment ICR-treatment 
Wage .184*** (.011) .164*** (.014) 
Desired effort .049 (.066) .065 (.081) 
Private offer .878*** (.284) .791*** (.294) 
Previous length .176*** (.052) – 
constant -2.185*** (.499) -1.754** (.732) 
 N = 523 N = 417 
 LL = -716.53 LL = -599.38 
 Waldχ(22) = 1015.14 Waldχ(20) = 648.11 
 Prob = .000 Prob = .000 
Note: The estimation procedure is a censored regression with robust standard errors (in 
parentheses). The regressions include period dummies to control for time effects and session 
dummies to control for session effects. *** indicates significance on the 1-percent level, ** on 
the 5-percent level and * on the 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
 
From a theoretical viewpoint (see Appendix 1) the effectiveness of a contingent renewal 
policy in the first 14 periods requires that there is a rent in the final period because in the absence 
of a rent rational and selfish workers cannot be disciplined in the pre-final periods. From Table 4 
we know already that the workers earned a rent in the final period of the ICF. It would, however, 
be reassuring if the rents that accrue to the workers in one-shot interactions do not occur 
accidentally but are the result of a reasonable economic decision of the firms. One reason why 
the workers may get paid a rent in one-shot encounters, like, e.g., in period 15 of the ICF and in 
all periods of the ICR, is the existence of reciprocal workers. In the presence of fair workers it 
may be profitable for the firms to make generous contract offers even in one-shot encounters to 
induce fair workers to choose non-minimal effort levels. The next result shows that this is indeed 
the case.  
 
Result 10: It is profitable for the firms to pay rents in one-shot encounters because the relation 
between effort and wage is sufficiently steep. Both in the ICR-condition and in the 
final period of the ICF-condition the workers earn substantial rents. 
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The profitability of paying a rent in one-shot encounters is shown in Figure 9, which depicts the 
relation between the firms’ material payoff and the workers’ current rents in the ICR-condition. 
The workers’ current rents are computed as the difference between the workers current income 
from trading and the unemployment benefit of 5. The figure shows a “concave” relation between 
the firms’ material payoff and the workers’ rents. For rents up to 30 the firms’ payoff is 
increasing in the workers’ rents. For higher rents it is decreasing. We have computed the same 
relation for period 15 of the ICF and found similar results. Initially the firms’ profit is increasing 
in the workers’ rent and for higher rent levels it is decreasing.  
 
 
FIGURE  9: Relation between firms’ profits and workers’ rents in the ICR-condition  
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Our previous results suggest that the firms’ contingent renewal policy was a very powerful effort 
elicitation device. Since the total surplus is monotonically increasing in the effort level the 
possibility of contingent renewal in the ICF led to a clear increase in the total gains from trade 
relative to the ICR. This raises the question how this increase in the gains from trade is 
distributed between firms and workers. Do both parties benefit from the increase in the gains 
from trade or does only one party benefit, perhaps even at the expense of the other?  
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Result 11: On average, both the firms and the workers are better off in the ICF- relative to the 
ICR-condition. The firms gain more from the increase in the gains from trade than 
the workers. 
 
Figure 10 reveals the time trend of the firms’ profits and the workers’ rents per trade in both 
conditions. In all periods except period 15 the firms earn much more in the ICF than in the ICR. 
In the final period they still earn more in the ICF but the difference is not as large as in the other 
periods. In the ICR the firms’ profits vary between 5 and 13 while in the first 14 periods of the 
ICF their profits vary between 21 and 36. There can thus be little doubt that the possibility of 
forming long-term relations benefits the firms. This is also supported by a Mann Whitney test (p 
= 0.0143) with session averages as the units of analysis. Yet, Figure 10 also shows that the 
workers do better in every period of the ICF compared to the ICR. While at the beginning the 
difference in the workers’ rents across conditions is relatively small, over time the difference 
becomes quite large. A Mann Whitney test shows that the difference in workers’ rents per trade 
across conditions is significant (p = 0.05 with session averages as the units of analysis). Thus, the 
ICF-condition represents a Pareto-improvement relative to the ICR.  
FIGURE 10: Time trend of firms’ profits and workers’ rents per trade in the ICF- and the 
ICR-condition 
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It is also interesting that both the firms’ profits and the workers’ rents increase over time in the 
ICF. This neatly shows that both trading parties gain from the steady increase in the effort level 
that occurs in the ICF. In the final period there is a large drop in the firms’ profit, which is 
caused by the effort reduction. This effort reduction is consistent with the view that the material 
incentives that were generated by the firms’ contingent renewal policy were responsible for the 
high performance in the ICF relative to the ICR. In the final period contingent renewal no longer 
works and, hence, selfish worker can no longer be disciplined. The effort reduction in the final 
period should, however, not make us overlook the fact that even in the absence of contingent 
renewal non-minimal effort levels have been enforced because a substantial fraction of the 
workers still reciprocated even in one-shot encounters (i.e., in the ICR and the final period of the 
ICF).  
The relatively high rents of the workers in all the periods of the ICF-condition are 
interesting for three reasons. First, they indicate that in all the periods unemployment was 
involuntary because the unemployed workers would have been better off if they had had a job. 
Moreover, as the very low rents for employed workers in the C-condition show, the unemployed 
workers would have been willing to work at substantially lower wages. Second, the high rents 
show that the entrance fee critique against the disciplining version of the efficiency wage 
hypothesis does not apply here. This critique says that any rent that is earned by the workers in 
future periods will be extracted up-front by the firms by charging an entrance fee (Carmichael 
1985). While it was not possible to charge an entrance fee in our experiment it was possible to 
pay wages of zero. By paying w = 0 in period t and demanding the maximum effort the firms 
could at least extract part of the huge future rents from the workers. However, there is simply no 
evidence that firms ever tried such a policy. Instead firms attempted to share the total gains from 
a trade in each period. Except for periods 2 and 15 the workers’ share in the gains from trade 
varied between 42 and 49 percent (in period 2 and 15 it was even above 50 percent). In view of 
the workers’ behavior the firms’ sharing policy was quite rational because the workers’ effort 
choice in t strongly varied with the wage in t. Thirdly, the high rents provide a rationale for the 
absence of disagreements about contract conditions in the ICF. In the C-condition the firms took 
advantage of the excess supply of workers and their attempts to enforce low wages led to a 
considerable rejection of offers. In the ICF-condition the workers had little reason to bargain 
about the terms of the contract because the firms did offer contracts with rather high rents.  
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5. Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown that contractual incompleteness and the associated enforcement 
problems change the nature of market interactions in a fundamental manner. When contracts are 
complete the identity of the trading partner is irrelevant and the vast majority of trades takes 
place in one-shot transactions. The short side of the market uses its bargaining power to squeeze 
the long side of the market, which creates considerable disagreement on contract terms. In 
contrast, when contracts are incomplete, firms care about the identity of their workers. They 
voluntarily constrain the set of trading partners by restricting their offers exclusively to particular 
workers with whom they trade repeatedly. Workers typically earn considerable rents and there is 
little disagreement on the terms of the contract. Firms implement a policy of contingent contract 
renewal that rewards high and satisfactory performance with the renewal of the contract. When 
we remove the opportunity of renewing the contract with the previous worker there is a 
substantial drop in the average effort and the minimal effort becomes the most frequently chosen 
effort level. Under incomplete contracts firms have little incentives to extract current or future 
rents from the workers by low offers because this leads to an immediate reduction in the effort 
level. Both the firms and the workers are better off if they are allowed to engage in long-term 
relations.  
We also find evidence suggesting that workers accumulate reputational capital and become 
more loyal to their firms in the course of long-term relations. In longer lasting relations firms 
expect higher effort levels and they experience less subjective uncertainty regarding effort 
realization. Moreover, workers in longer lasting relations do indeed provide higher effort levels 
making firms, ceteris paribus, more reluctant to fire them.  
We believe that, apart from the insights provided by this paper, there are also 
methodological returns from our experiments. With appropriate modifications and additional 
treatment conditions our experimental set-up can be used to examine a host of other interesting 
questions. In our framework, for instance, one could easily study the market and efficiency 
consequences of employment legislation rendering layoffs costly for the firms. Another 
interesting question is what happens if firms receive information on the unemployment history of 
the workers. Do workers who have been unemployed for prolonged periods of time get 
stigmatized, i.e., do they get fewer and worse offers? A further important questions is how 
markets work in which the sellers can acquire a general reputation for being trustworthy. In our 
experiments the workers could only acquire a relation-specific reputation because the other firms 
did not know how well a particular worker worked. While this is a natural set-up for many labor 
markets, there are clearly many goods markets in which the sellers have the opportunity to 
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acquire a general reputation. Moreover, one could allow the sellers to invest into costly 
advertising to create a general reputation.  
Also, questions regarding the interaction between explicit and implicit incentives have 
remained largely unexplored empirically. For instance, is it indeed the case that the availability 
of better explicit incentives makes self-enforcing agreements less likely – as hypothesized by 
Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) and Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995). Or: How do decisions 
with regard to vertical integration interact with relational contracts (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 
2002)?  
Finally, our set-up lends itself to the analysis of the question to what extent self-enforcing 
implicit agreements are associated with price or wage stickiness. In our view it may well be that 
the existence of long-term relations introduces considerable inertia into the system. Our results 
suggest that long-term relations are embedded into a system of implicit obligations and beliefs 
about obligations that render fairness concerns prominent. Once a worker and a firm have 
established a long lasting implicit agreement fairness concerns and the coordination problems 
involved in reaching a different implicit agreement may render the parties unwilling to change 
the agreement despite the existence of supply or demand shocks.  
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Appendix 1 
In this appendix we show in more detail how high effort levels can be sustained in a perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium in the ICF condition if sufficiently many fair subjects who reciprocate 
generous contract offers with generous effort levels are present. For tractability reasons our 
argument relies on the theory of fairness developed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). In the two-
player case the utility function of fair players is thus given by 
Ui(x) = xi - αi max{xj - xi,0} - βi max{xi - xj,0}, 
 i ∈ {1,2}, i ≠ j, where x=(x1,x2) denotes the vector of monetary payoffs and βi ≤ αi, 0 ≤ βi < 1. 
The term weighted with αi measures the utility loss that stems from inequality to i’s 
disadvantage, while the term weighted with βi measures the loss from advantageous inequality. 
We use a grossly simplified version of this theory. We assume that there are 40 percent self-
interested types (αi = βi = 0) and 60 percent fair types. Fair subjects exhibit αi = βi = 0.5+ε, 
where ε is a small positive number. Fair subjects thus have a willingness to pay in order to 
achieve equality. If the inequality is to their disadvantage, they are prepared to engage in costly 
"punishment" in order to reduce the payoff of their opponent. If the inequality is to their 
advantage, they are willing to spend resources in order to benefit the other player. Subjects with 
αi = βi = 0.5+ε are willing to share the surplus of a contract equally.  
For our application we make two further simplifying assumptions. We assume that, once 
a contract has been accepted, the only reference agent for a subject in our experiment is his or 
her trading partner. This allows us to use the above two-person utility function to study the effort 
behavior of the workers. We believe that this assumption well approximates the subjects’ 
perception of the situation because they do not know the effort that is provided in other trades. In 
addition, once a contract has been concluded the trading partner has clearly a salient position for 
a subject in our experiment. We also assume that each firm can make exactly one offer, private 
or public, per period and that the firms’ offers are made simultaneously. We make this 
assumption for reasons of tractability. The strategy space of continuous auctions, in which many 
firms and workers interact and in which the traders continuously can make offers during the 
trading period, is so large that this institution has so far defied a fully rigorous analysis. 
Therefore, we approximate this institution by a posted contract institution in which each firm 
simultaneously makes one offer per period.  
On the basis of the above assumptions it can be shown that the following strategies are 
part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the ICF-condition. The strategy of the workers is as 
follows: In all periods the fair workers choose the payoff equalizing effort level. They accept any 
contract that gives them a non-negative payoff. The selfish workers also accept any contract that 
give them a non-negative material payoff. They perform at the desired effort level if the cost of 
the desired effort in period t-1 is less than or equal to the expected loss from being fired.  
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The firms’ strategy is as follows: In all periods a firm renews the contract with the 
previous worker if the worker provided the desired effort level. Otherwise, the worker does not 
get a new offer from his previous firm. Firms make a public offer in period 1, and whenever they 
do not renew the contract of the previous worker. From period 1 to 13 all firms offer a contract 
(w, e~ ) = (59, 10). This contract equalizes the material payoff if the worker chooses e = 10. In 
period 14 all firms offer the contract (w, e~ ) = (40, 7). This contract equalizes the material payoff 
if the worker chooses e = 7. In period 15 the selfish firm offers (w, e~ ) = (34, 6) while the fair 
firm offers (w, e~ ) = (5, 1). Both contracts again equalize the material payoffs of the trading 
parties if the worker provides the desired effort level. Note that the period-15-contract of the fair 
firms gives all workers a payoff of 5, which is identical to the unemployment benefit of 5. This 
contrasts with the contract of the selfish firms. This contract gives the fair workers a payoff of 
26, and the selfish workers (who shirk in the final period) a payoff of 34.  
The strategies described above are supported by out-of-equilibrium beliefs of the workers 
that the firm terminates the relation at the end of the period if it does not pay a “fair” wage in this 
period. The “fair” wage is the wage that equalizes the payoff if the worker chooses the desired 
effort level e~ . If, however, the firm pays a fair wage in period t, the worker believes that he will 
get a new offer in period t+1 with probability 1. 
The crucial intuition behind this equilibrium is the existence of a rent in period 15. Note 
that when all subjects are selfish firms have no incentive to offer a rent in period 15. In the 
presence of fair workers, however, the selfish firms have an incentive to pay a relatively high 
wage in period 15 because the fair workers respond to high wages in any given period t with 
payoff equalizing effort levels in period t. This makes it profitable for the selfish firms to pay a 
high wage in period 15. In contrast, the fair firms do not pay a high wage in period 15 because 
they derive extra disutility from the shirking of the selfish workers. The reason is that shirking 
causes inequality to the disadvantage of the firm, which is negatively valued by fair firms. Thus, 
in period 15 the fair workers induce the selfish firms to pay a high wage while the selfish 
workers induce the fair firms to pay a low wage.  
To be more precise recall that, by assumption, there are 60 percent fair types and 40 
percent selfish types. For any given wage the fair workers prefer an effort level that equalizes πf 
and πw, i.e., an effort such that )(10 ecwwe −=− holds. Differentiating yields 
[ ])('10/2/ ecwe +=∂∂ . We consider first the effort and wage decisions in period 15. Remember 
that in equilibrium the workers’ type is not yet revealed when the firms decide on their contract 
offer in t = 15. The expected material payoff of a firm, which does not know the type of the 
worker, is [ ] [ ]wwweE f −+−= 104.0)(106.0π  where )(we denotes the fair worker’s effort level. 
Differentiation with suspect to w yields [ ] 1))('10/(121)/(6/ −+=−∂∂=∂∂ ecwewE fπ . This 
derivative is zero if c’(e) = 2, which is the case for all { }8,...,4,3∈e . Thus, the firm’s profit is the 
same for all wages that induce effort levels in the set { }8,...,4,3 . They all give an expected profit 
of 6=fEπ . This means that the selfish firm is indifferent between any { }8,...,4,3~∈e . The fair 
  
3 
firm, however, prefers e~ = 1 and 5=w . This gives her an expected utility of 
55110 =−⋅=fEU . For any 1~ >e  the selfish worker will shirk which causes disadvantageous 
inequality for the fair firm. For example, to induce fair worker to choose 3~ =e  a firm has to pay 
162/)230( =+=w . The expected utility of this wage offer is 
[ ] ααπ 8.86)1610(164.0 −=−−−= ff EEU . The term in the brackets is the payoff difference 
between πw and πf if the worker shirks, which happens with probability 4.0 . It is easy to see that 
for 2/1≥α , 5<fEU , i.e., the fair firm prefers 1~ =e  over e~  = 3. The same holds for all wages 
inducing 1~ >e . Thus while (w, e~ ) = (5,1) is the utility maximizing offer for fair firms in t = 15, 
(w, e~ ) = (34,6) is a (non-unique) utility maximizing offer for selfish firms. The rest of our 
argument is based on the assumption that selfish firms offer (34,6) in t = 15 but in view of the 
non-uniqueness of the best offer different assumptions would be equally legitimate. 
In order to compute the expected loss of the workers from shirking in t = 14 it is 
important to recall that in t = 14 the workers do not know the type of their firm. They thus do not 
know for sure which offer they will receive in t = 15 in case that they meet the desired effort in t 
= 14. Since there are 60 percent fair firms and 40 percent selfish firms a fair worker, who does 
not know the type of his firm, has an expected payoff of [ ] 4.138344.056.0 =−+⋅=wEπ  in 
period 15. A selfish worker, who does not know the type of his firm, has an expected payoff of 
[ ] 6.160344.056.0 =−+⋅=wEπ  in period 15. Therefore the payoff gain from being employed in 
the final period is 6.1156.16 =−  for the selfish worker and 4.854.13 =−  for the fair worker.23 
This means that the implicit threat of firing the worker in case he shirks in t = 14 induces a 
selfish worker to provide up to 7~ =e  in period 14. The selfish worker prefers, however, to shirk 
if the firm demands 7~ >e in t = 14 because c( e~ ) ≥ 12 for e~ > 7. 
Given the behavior of the selfish worker it is optimal for all firms to demand 7~ =e  in 
14=t  and pay the payoff-equalizing wage of 40=w  for that effort level. It does not pay to offer 
40>w  because only fair workers will reward this and it also does not pay to offer 40<w . In 
the latter case the workers believe that the contract will not be renewed in 15=t . Therefore 
40<w  induces full shirking of the selfish worker and - depending on the value of w – partial 
shirking )7~1( =<< ee  of the fair worker. It is also obvious that in case of ee ~=  in t  the firm 
must make a private offer to the previous worker because otherwise the firm risks to be paired 
with a new worker in 1+t . Since this would be anticipated it would dilute the incentives of the 
selfish worker in t . 
If a worker has shirked and the firm does not renew the contract with this worker the firm 
is indifferent between a private and a public offer, i.e., the public offer is also optimal. In 13=t  
the expected rent from employment in the final two periods for a selfish worker is 
[ ] 6.366.115)1040( =+−− . This means that in 13=t  the selfish worker can be induced to 
provide 10~ =e  because 6.3618)10( <=c . Therefore, it is optimal for all firms to offer contracts 
                                                 
23 Note that the probability of getting reemployed by a different employer, after a unilateral deviation from the 
equilibrium effort, is zero because, in equilibrium, all other employers renew the contracts with their previous 
workers.  
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)10,59()~,( =ew  in 13=t . By backward induction this is also the optimal offer in all previous 
periods. The fair workers choose 10~ == ee  because at 59=w  this is the fair choice while 
selfish workers choose 10=e  because the threat of not getting the contract renewed provides 
enough incentives. 
Finally, note that accepting any offer with a non-negative payoff is rational for a fair 
worker as long as the worker believes that there are selfish unemployed workers. Since the 
selfish workers accepts any non-negative payoff a fair worker can never punish a firm by 
rejecting a low offer.  
The previous argument shows that in the first 13 periods it is possible to sustain the 
maximum effort level in the ICF. Since in the ICR only one-shot interactions can take place the 
maximum effort level cannot be enforced.  
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Appendix 2 
 
Appendix 2 contains the English translation of the German instructions for the ICF-treatment. 
Except for the treatment differences, the instructions for  the ICR- and the C-treatment were 
exactly like the ICF-instructions.  
 
Instructions for Buyers 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. Everything 
that you need to know in order to participate in this experiment is explained below. Should you have any difficulties 
in understanding these instructions please notify us. We will answer your questions at your cubicle. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial endowment of 10 Swiss Francs. During the course of 
the experiment you can earn a further amount of money by gaining points. The amount of points that you gain 
during the experiment depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants.  
 
All points that you gain during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into Swiss Francs at the end of the 
experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
1 point = 0.15 Swiss Francs 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the money that you earned during the experiment in addition to 
your endowment of 10 Francs. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions, which you will enter on a 
computer screen. There are 15 periods in all. 
 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the experiment. In addition we 
would like to point out that you may only use the computer functions which are required for the experiment. 
Communication between participants and unnecessary interference with computers will lead to the exclusion from 
the experiment. In case you have any questions don't hesitate to ask us. 
 
Prior to the experiment the 17 participants were divided into 2 groups: buyers and sellers. In this experiment there 
are 10 sellers and 7 buyers. 
 
You are a buyer throughout the whole experiment. All participants have received an identification number which 
they will keep for the entire experiment. Your identification number is stated on the documentation sheet in front of 
you. 
 
An Overview of the Experimental Procedures 
 
In each period of the experiment every buyer can buy a product from a seller. The seller earns a profit by trading if 
he sells the product at a price, which exceeds his production costs. The buyer earns a profit by trading if the price he 
pays for the product is less than what the product is worth to him. The production costs and the product's value for 
the buyer depend on the quality of the product.  
 
The experiment lasts for 15 periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
 
1. Each period starts with a trading phase which lasts 3 minutes. During this phase buyers can submit offers, 
which can be accepted by sellers. When submitting an offer a buyer has to specify three things: 
• which price he offers to pay, 
• which product quality he desires, 
• and finally, which seller he wants to submit the offer to. Buyers can submit two types of offers; private 
offers and public offers. Private offers are submitted to one seller only and can only be accepted by that 
seller. Public offers are submitted to all sellers and can be accepted by any seller. 
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As a buyer you can - in each period - submit as many offers as you like. Submitted offers can be accepted at any 
time during the trading phase. Each buyer and each seller can at most conclude one trade in each period. 
As there are 10 sellers and 7 buyers, several sellers will not trade in each period. 
 
 
2. Following the trading phase each seller who has concluded a trade determines which product quality he will 
supply. The seller is not obliged to supply the product quality desired by his buyer. Once every seller has 
chosen a product quality each participant's earnings in the current period are determined. After this the next 
period starts. 
 
The points gained from all 15 periods will be summed up at the end of the experiment, exchanged into Swiss Francs 
and paid together with your endowment in cash. 
 
The Experimental Procedures in Detail 
 
There are 7 buyers and 10 sellers in the experiment. You are a buyer throughout the whole experiment. During the 
experiment you will enter your decisions on a computer screen. In the following we describe in detail how you can 
make your decisions in each period. 
 
1. The Trading Phase 
 
Each period starts with a trading phase. During the trading phase each buyer can conclude a trade with a seller. In 
order to do so each buyer can submit as many offers as he wishes. In each trading phase you will see the 
following screen: 
 
 
• In the top left corner of the screen you see in which period of the experiment you are. In the top right corner of 
the screen you will see the time remaining in this trading phase, displayed in seconds. The trading phase in 
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each period lasts 3 minutes (= 180 seconds). When this time is up the trading phase is over. Hereafter, no 
further offers can be submitted or accepted in this period. 
• Once the above screen is displayed the trading phase starts. As a buyer you now have the opportunity to submit 
offers to the sellers. In order to do so you have to enter three things on the right hand side of the screen: 
 
a) First you have to specify whether you want to submit a public or a private offer: 
 
• Public trade offers 
Public offers will be communicated to all participants in the market. All sellers see all public offes on 
their screens. A public offer can therefore be accepted by any seller. As a buyer you will also see all 
public offers submitted by all buyers. 
If you want to submit a public offer, click on the field "public", using the mouse. 
 
• Private trade offers 
A private offer is submitted to one seller only. Only this seller is informed about the offer and only 
this seller can accept the offer. No other seller or buyer will be informed about that offer. 
If you want to submit a private offer, click on the field „private“ using the mouse. After that you 
specify which seller you want to submit the offer to in the field below. Each of the 10 sellers has an 
identification number (seller 1, seller 2, ....., seller 10). Each seller keeps his identification number 
throughout the whole experiment. To submit an offer to a specific seller you enter the number of that 
seller (e.g., "4" for seller 4). 
 
b) Once you have specified to whom you want to submit an offer, you must determine which price you offer. 
You enter this in the field "Your price". The price you offer is a number between 0 and 100: 
 
0 ≤ price offered ≤ 100 
 
c) Finally you have to specify which product quality you desire. You enter this in the field "Desired quality". 
Your desired quality is a number between 1 and 10: 
 
1 ≤ desired quality ≤ 10 
 
After you have completely specified your offer, you must click on the "OK" button to submit it. As long as 
you have not clicked "OK" you can change your offer. After you click "OK" the offer will be displayed to 
all sellers you have submitted it to. 
 
• On the left side of your screen you see the header "public offers". All public offers in the current trading phase 
are displayed here. Your public offers as well as those of all other buyers will be displayed. You can see which 
buyer submitted the offer, which price he offered and which quality he desired. All buyers also have an 
identification number, which they keep throughout the whole experiment. 
 
• In the middle of your screen under the header "Your private offers". You see all private offers, which you have 
submitted in the current trading phase. You see which price you offered, which quality you desired and which 
seller you submitted an offer to. 
 
• Each buyer can submit as many private and public offers as he wishes in each period. Each offer that you 
submit can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. 
 
• In any given period each buyer can conclude at most one trade. Once one of your offers has been accepted 
you will be notified which seller accepted which of your offers. In the bottom right corner of your screen the 
identification number of the seller will be displayed as well as your offered price and your desired quality. As 
you can conclude only one trade in each period all your other offers will be automatically cancelled. Also, you 
will not be able to submit any further offers. 
 
• In any given period each seller can conclude at most one trade. You will be continuously informed which 
sellers have not yet accepted an offer. On the right bottom of the screen you see 10 fields, each field for one of 
the ten sellers. Once a seller has accepted an offer a „x“ will appear in the field next to the seller’s identification 
number. You cannot submit private offers to a seller who has already concluded a trade. 
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• Once all 7 buyers have concluded a trade or after 3 minutes have elapsed, the trading phase is over. 
 
• No buyer is obliged to submit offers, and no seller is obliged to accept an offer. 
 
2. Determination of the Product Quality 
 
• Follwoing the trading phase, all sellers who have concluded a trade determine which product quality they 
supply to their respective buyers. The product quality, which you desired in your offer, is not binding for 
your seller. Your seller can choose the exact quality you desired, but he can also choose a higher or a lower 
product quality. The product quality which your seller chooses has to be between 1 and 10: 
 
1 ≤ product quality ≤ 10 
 
• While your seller determines the actual product quality, we ask you to specify which quality you expect him to 
supply on a separate screen. In addition we ask you to state how sure you are about this expectation. 
 
How are the Incomes Calculated? 
 
Your income: 
 
• If you do not conclude a trade during a trading phase you receive an income of 0 points in that period. 
 
• If one of your offers is accepted, your income depends on the price you offered and on the product quality. 
Your income is determined as follows: 
 
Your income = 10 * product quality  - price 
 
• As you can see from the above formula your income is higher, the higher the product quality actually supplied 
by your seller. At the same time your income is higher, the lower the price you paid for the product. 
 
Income of your seller 
 
• If a seller has not concluded a trade during a trading phase he gains an income of 5 points in that period. 
 
• If a seller has accepted an offer his income equals the price he receives minus the production costs he incurs. 
The income of the seller is determined as follows: 
 
Income of your seller  = Price -  production costs 
 
 
• The production costs of a seller are higher, the higher the quality he chooses. The production costs for each 
product quality are displayed in the table below: 
 
Product quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Production costs 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
 
• The income of your seller is higher, the higher the price. Further, his income is higher, the lower the product 
quality he supplies. 
 
 
The income of all buyers and sellers are determined in the same way. Each buyer can therefore calculate the 
income of his seller and each seller can calculate the income of his buyer. Further, each buyer and seller is 
informed about the identification number of his trading partner in each period. 
 
Experimental Instructions 
 
5
Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses have to be paid from your initial 
endowment or from earnings made in other periods. 
 
You will be informed about your income and the income of your seller on an "income screen". On the screen (see 
below) the following will be displayed: 
• which seller you traded with 
• which price you offered 
• your desired quality 
• the product quality actually chosen by your seller 
• the income of your seller in this period 
• your income in this period. 
 
 
Please enter all the information in the documentation sheet supplied to you. After the income screen has been 
displayed, the period is over. Thereafter the trading phase of the following period starts. Once you have finished 
studying the income screen please click on the "continue" button. 
 
The sellers also see an income screen, which displays the above information. They see the ID of their trading 
partner, the price, desired and actually supplied product quality as well as both incomes. 
 
The experiment will not start until all participants are completely familiar with all procedures. In order to secure that 
this is the case we kindly ask you to solve the exercises below. 
 
In addition we will conduct 2 trials of the trading phase, so that you can get accustomed to the computer. During 
the trial phases no money can be earned. After the trial phases we will begin the experiment, which will last for 15 
periods. 
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Control Questionnaire 
 
Please solve the following exercises completely. If you have questions ask the experimenter.  
 
Exercise 1 
You did not make an offer during a trading phase. What is you income in this period? 
 Your income =  
 
Exercise 2 
You offered a price of 30 and indicated a desired quality of 9. A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a 
quality of 8.  
 Your income =  
 Income of your seller =  
 
Exercise 3 
You offered a price of 60 and indicated a desired quality of 9. A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a 
quality of 6.  
 Your income =  
 Income of your seller =  
 
Exercise 4 
You offered a price of 10 and indicated a desired quality of 2. A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a 
quality of 5.  
 Your income =  
 Income of your seller =  
 
Exercise 5 
You offered a price of 10 and indicated a desired quality of 6. A seller accepts your offer and actually chooses a 
quality of 2.  
 Your income =  
 Income of your seller =  
 
Exercise 6 
A seller did not accept an offer during a trading phase. What is the income of this seller in this period? 
 Income of your seller =  
 
Exercise 7 
You made several offers during a trading phase. None of your offers has been accepted by a seller. What is your 
income in this period?  
 Your income =  
 
If you have finished the exercises we recommend to look again at the exercises and the solutions provided. After this 
please think about the decisions you want to make during the experiment.  
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Documentation sheet: Buyer 
 
This documentation sheet is meant for your orientation. Please complete the respective row in 
each period.  
 
 
 
period ID of your 
seller  
price desired 
quality 
actual quality income of your 
seller 
your income
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13       
14       
15       
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Instructions for Sellers 
 
 
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Please read the following instructions carefully. Everything 
that you need to know in order to participate in this experiment is explained below. Should you have any difficulties 
in understanding these instructions please notify us. We will answer your questions at your cubicle. 
 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial endowment of 10 Swiss Francs. During the course of 
the experiment you can earn a further amount of money by gaining points. The amount of points that you gain 
during the experiment depends on your decisions and the decisions of other participants.  
 
All points that you gain during the course of the experiment will be exchanged into Swiss Francs at the end of the 
experiment. The exchange rate will be: 
 
1 point = 0.15 Swiss Francs 
 
At the end of the experiment you will receive the money that you earned during the experiment in addition to 
your endowment of 10 Francs. 
 
The experiment is divided into periods. In each period you have to make decisions which you will enter in a 
computer. In total there are 15 periods. 
 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the experiment. In addition we 
would like to point out that you may only use the computer functions which are required for the experiment. 
Communication between participants and unnecessary interference with computers will lead to the exclusion from 
the experiment. In case you have any questions don't hesitate to ask us. 
 
Prior to the experiment the 17 participants were divided into 2 groups: buyers and sellers. In this experiment there 
are 10 sellers and 7 buyers. 
 
You are a seller throughout the whole experiment. All participants have received an identification number which 
they will keep for the entire experiment. Your identification number is stated on the documentation sheet in front of 
you. 
 
An Overview of the Experimental Procedures 
 
In each period of the experiment every buyer can buy a product from a seller. The seller earns a profit by trading if 
he sells the product at a price which exceeds his production costs. The buyer earns a profit by trading if the price he 
pays for the product is less than what the product is worth to him. The production costs and the product's value for 
the buyer depend on the quality of the product.  
 
The experiment lasts 15 for periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
 
3. Each period starts with a trading phase, which lasts 3 for minutes. During this phase buyers can submit trade 
offers which can be accepted by sellers. When submitting an offer a buyer has to specify three things: 
• which price he offers to pay, 
• which product quality he desires, 
• and finally, which seller he wants to submit the offer to. Buyers can submit two types of offers; private 
offers and public offers. Private offers are submitted to one seller only and can only be accepted by that 
seller. Public offers are submitted to all sellers and can be accepted by any seller. 
 
Buyers can - in each period - submit as many offers as they like. Submitted offers can be accepted at any time 
during the trading phase. Each buyer and each seller can only conclude one trade in each period. As there 
are 10 sellers and 7 buyers, several sellers will not trade in each period. 
 
 
4. Following the trading phase each seller who has concluded a trade determines which product quality he will 
supply. The seller is not obliged to supply the product quality desired by his buyer. Once every seller has 
Experimental Instructions 
 
9
chosen a product quality each participant's earnings in the current period are determined. After this the next 
period starts. 
 
The points gained from all 15 periods will be summed up at the end of the experiment, exchanged into Swiss Francs 
and paid together with your endowment in cash. 
 
The Experimental Procedures in Detail 
 
There are 7 buyers and 10 sellers in the experiment. You are a seller throughout the whole experiment. During the 
experiment you will enter your decisions on a computer screen. In the following we describe in detail how you can 
make your decisions in each period. 
 
1. The Trading Phase 
 
Each period starts with a trading phase. During the trading phase each buyer can conclude a trade with a seller. In 
order to do this the buyers can submit offers to the sellers. As a seller you can - in each period - accept one of the 
offers. During the trading phase you will see the following screen: 
 
 
 
• In the top left corner of the screen you see in which period of the experiment you are. In the top right corner of 
the screen you see the remaining time in the current trading phase, displayed in seconds. The trading phase in 
each period lasts 3 minutes (= 180 seconds). When this time is up the trading phase is over. Hereafter, no 
further offers can be submitted or accepted for this period. 
 
• Once the above screen is displayed the trading phase starts. As a seller you can now accept offers submitted by 
the buyers. There are two types of offers which you can accept: 
• Private offers to you 
Each buyer has the opportunity to submit private offers to you. You alone will be informed about 
these offers and you alone can accept them. No other seller or buyer is informed about these offers. 
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If you receive private offers, they will appear on the left side of your screen, below the header "Private 
offers to you". The offer of a buyer contains the following information: the identification number of 
the buyer who submitted the offer, the price which he offers for the product and which product quality 
he desires. If you want to accept a private offer, you click first on the respective row in which the offer 
is displayed. When you do this, the offer will be highlighted. If you are sure you want to accept the 
offer you then click on the button "accept" which you find at the bottom of the screen. As long as you 
do not click "accept" you can alter your choice.  
 
• Public offers 
Each buyer also has the possibility to submit public offers. All sellers are informed about these offers 
and any seller can accept them. If a buyer submits a public offer it appears on the right side of your 
screen, below the header "Public offers". The offer of a buyer again contains the identification number 
of the buyer who submitted the offer, the price which he offers for the product and which product 
quality he desires. This information is also displayed to all other sellers and all buyers. If you want to 
accept a public offer you follow the same procedures as with private offers. You click first on the 
respective row in which the offer is displayed. When you are sure that you want to accept the offer you 
click on the button "accept" which you find at the bottom right corner of the screen. As long as you do 
not click "accept" you can alter your choice.  
 
 
• As soon as you have pressed the „accept“ button you will see which offer you have accepted in the bottom row 
of your screen. 
 
• Each seller can conclude at most one trade in each period. Once you have accepted one offer you cannot 
accept any further offers. 
 
All buyers have to observe the following rules when submitting trade offers: 
 
• The price offered by the buyer must be between 0 and 100: 
 
0 ≤ price ≤ 100 
 
• The desired quality of the buyer must be between 1 and 10: 
 
1 ≤ desired quality ≤ 10 
 
 
• Each buyer can - in each period - submit as many private and public offers as he wishes. Each offer 
submitted by a buyer can be accepted at any time during the trading phase. 
 
• Each buyer can conclude at most one trade in each period. Once an offer of a buyer has been accepted he 
will be informed about which seller accepted the offer. As each buyer can conclude only one trade in each 
period all other offers of the buyer will automatically be cancelled. Also, he cannot submit any further offers. 
 
• Once all 7 buyers have concluded a trade or after 3 minutes have elapsed, the trading phase is over. 
 
• No buyer is obliged to submit offers, and no seller is obliged to accept an offer. 
 
 
2. Determination of the Actual Product Quality 
 
• Following the trading phase, all sellers who have concluded a trade determine which product quality they 
supply to their buyers. The product quality desired by your buyer is not binding for you as a seller. You 
can exactly choose the quality desired by your buyer, but also a higher or lower product quality. If you have 
concluded a trade during a trading phase, the following screen will appear. Here, you have to enter the product 
quality: 
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In order to choose the actual product quality, you enter the value for the quality in the field "Choose the actual 
quality" and press the "OK" button to confirm your choice. As long as you have not pressed "OK" you can alter your 
choice. 
 
• The product quality you choose must be an integer between 1 and 10: 
 
1 ≤ product quality ≤ 10 
 
 
How are the Incomes calculated? 
 
Your income 
 
• If you have not concluded a trade during a trading phase you receive an income of 5 points in that period. 
 
• If you have accepted an offer your income depends on the price you accepted and the product quality you 
choose to deliver. Your income is calculated as follows:   
 
Your income  = Price -  production costs 
 
 
• Your production costs are higher, the higher the quality of the product you chose to deliver. The production 
costs for each product quality are displayed in the table below: 
 
Product quality 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Production costs 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
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• Your income is therefore higher, the lower the product quality. Further, your income is higher, the higher the 
price.  
 
 
The income of your buyer: 
 
• If a buyer does not conclude a trade during a trading phase he receives an income of 0 points in that period. 
 
• If one of his offers is accepted, his income depends on the price he offered and the product quality. The income 
of your buyer will be determined as follows: 
 
Income of your buyer = 10 * product quality  - price 
 
• As you can see from the above formula the income of your buyer is higher, the higher the product quality 
actually supplied by you. At the same time his income is higher, the lower the price he paid for the product. 
 
The income of all buyers and sellers are determined in the same way. Each buyer can therefore calculate the 
income of his seller and each seller can calculate the income of his buyer. Further, each buyer and each seller is 
informed about the identification number of his trading partner in each period. 
 
Please note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses have to be paid from the initial 
endowment or from earnings made in other periods. 
 
You will be informed about your income and the income of your buyer on an "income screen". On the screen (see 
below) the following will be displayed: 
• Which buyer you traded with 
• Which price he offered 
• The desired quality of your buyer 
• The product quality actually chosen by you 
• The income of your buyer in this period 
• Your income in this period. 
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Please enter all the information in the documentation sheet supplied to you. After the income screen has been 
displayed, the period is over. Thereafter the trading phase of the following period starts. Once you have finished 
studying the income screen pleas click on the "continue" button. 
 
The buyers also see an income screen, which displays the above information. They see the ID of their trading 
partner, the price, the desired and the supplied product quality as well as both incomes. 
 
The experiment will not start until all participants are completely familiar with all procedures. In order to secure that 
this is the case we kindly ask you to solve the exercises below. 
 
In addition we will conduct 2 trials of the trading phase, so that you can get accustomed to the computer. During 
the trial phases no money can be earned. After the trial phases we will begin the experiment, which will last for 15 
periods. 
 
 
 
Control Questionnaire 
 
Please solve the following exercises completely. If you have questions ask the experimenter.  
 
Exercise 1 
You did not accept an offer during a trading phase. What is you income in this period? 
 Your income =  
 
Exercise 2 
You accepted an offer with a price of 30 and a desired quality of 9. You supplied an actual quality of 8.  
 Your income =  
 Income of your buyer =  
 
Exercise 3 
You accepted an offer with a price of 60 and a desired quality of 9. You supplied an actual quality of 4.  
 Your income =  
 Income of your buyer =  
 
Exercise 4 
You accepted an offer with a price of 40 and a desired quality of 2. You supplied an actual quality of 5.  
 Your income =  
 Income of your buyer =  
 
Exercise 5 
You accepted an offer with a price of 30 and a desired quality of 6. You supplied an actual quality of 6.  
 Your income =  
 Income of your buyer =  
 
Exercise 6 
A buyer has made several offers during a trading phase. None of these offers has been accepted by a seller. What is 
the income of the buyer in this period? 
 Income of buyer =  
 
 
If you have finished the exercises we recommend to look again at the exercises and the solutions provided. After this 
please think about the decisions you want to make during the experiment.  
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Documentation sheet: Seller 
 
This documentation sheet is meant for your orientation. Please complete the respective row in 
each period.  
 
 
period ID of your 
buyer 
price desired 
quality 
actual 
quality 
income of 
your buyer 
your income
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
7       
8       
9       
10       
11       
12       
13       
14       
15       
 
 
